

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/PV.282
16 August 1966
ENGLISH

THE UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN

NOV 18 1966

DOCUMENT
COLLECTION

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-SECOND MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 16 August 1966, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. G. O. IJEWERE (Nigeria)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

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|------------------------|---|
| <u>Brazil:</u> | Mr. A. F. AZEREDO da SILVEIRA Mr. D. SILVEIRA da MOTA Mr. A. da COSTA GUIMARAES Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE |
| <u>Bulgaria:</u> | Mr. C. LUKANOV Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV Mr. D. POPOV Mr. D. KOSTOV |
| <u>Burma:</u> | U MAUNG MAUNG U MAUNG MAUNG GYI |
| : <u>Canada:</u> | Mr. E. L. M. BURNS Mr. C. J. MARSHALL Mr. P. D. LEE |
| <u>Czechoslovakia:</u> | Mr. T. LAHODA Mr. V. VAJNAR |
| <u>Ethiopia:</u> | Mr. A. ABERRA Mr. A. ZELLEKE Mr. B. ASSFAW |
| <u>India:</u> | Mr. V. C. TRIVEDI Mr. K. P. LUKOSE Mr. K. P. JAIN |
| <u>Italy:</u> | Mr. F. CAVALLETTI Mr. G. P. TOZZOLI Mr. S. AVETTA |
| <u>Mexico:</u> | Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO |
| <u>Nigeria:</u> | Mr. G. O. IJEWERE Mr. M. B. BRIMAH |
| <u>Poland:</u> | Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN Mr. E. STANIEWSKI Mr. B. KAJDY |

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU

Mr. N. ECOBESCU

Mr. E. GLASER

Mr. C. UNGUREANU

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL

Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD

Mr. I. VIRGIN

Mr. R. BOMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. A. A. ROSHCHIN

Mr. I. I. CHEPROV

Mr. M. P. SHELEPIN

Mr. V. B. TOULINOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. H. KHALLAF

Mr. A. OSMAN

Mr. A. A. SALAM

United Kingdom:

Lord CHALFONT

Sir Harold BEELEY

Miss E. J. M. RICHARDSON

United States of America:

Mr. A. S. FISHER

Mr. L. WEILER

Mr. C. G. BREAM

Mr. A. NEIDLE

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Nigeria): I declare open the two hundred and eighty-second plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. LUKANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from Russian): The Bulgarian delegation is among those who still believe it to be necessary to consider the question of general and complete disarmament with a view to solving the problem radically and removing once and for all from international life mistrust, blackmail, threats and clashes between States. We are reminded of that vital necessity by the twenty-first anniversary of the dropping on Japanese cities of the first atomic bombs, which could be called baby bombs in comparison with the nuclear weapons that exist today.

For Bulgaria, just as for all other socialist countries, general and complete disarmament is a question of principle that forms part of its policy programme. The approach of our delegation to the solution of this question is inescapably linked with the need to eliminate in the first stages of the disarmament process the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war. We stand for strict international control which would not affect the security of other States but would fully ensure the fulfilment of the obligations laid down in a treaty. In other words, we stand for disarmament under strict international control. From this point of view our delegation also considers that the adoption of certain collateral measures which would eliminate the danger of war and the tension which leads to it would help to bring about a more tranquil international climate and would facilitate the approach to the solution of the basic problem.

A number of proposals for collateral measures designed to reduce the danger of war were once more confirmed and given a more topical note in the Declaration on the strengthening of peace and security in Europe which was adopted by the Conference of Warsaw Treaty countries in Bucharest. The socialist countries once again declared their support for such measures as the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the ending of underground nuclear tests, the establishment of denuclearized zones, the elimination of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of troops from foreign territories, prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons in general or of being the first to use them, and many other measures.

One of the proposals made in Bucharest does not appear on the agenda of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, but its implementation would immediately change for the better the situation in the world and consequently the situation in this Committee as well. That is the proposal addressed to the United States of America that it should put an end to its aggression against the peoples

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of Viet-Nam and South-East Asia, stop the criminal war in Indo-China, and cease violating the Charter and the resolutions of the United Nations which forbid it to interfere in the affairs of other States.

Of course, it is no easy matter to discuss the question of general and complete disarmament at a time when one of the great Powers, the United States of America, is engaged in military "escalation", carrying out almost daily transfers of troops to foreign territory, further mobilizations, and military operations in the air, on land and at sea in order to crush the will of a freedom-loving people. While, however, that state of affairs in the world increases the difficulties in regard to the positive accomplishment of broad measures in the field of disarmament, we should not slacken our efforts towards the accomplishment of at least some of the collateral measures on the agenda of the Committee on which we could achieve agreement.

It is well known that the socialist delegations have never adopted a neglectful attitude towards other proposals, and it is not from pride of authorship that they consider their own proposals more appropriate to the purpose. But in assessing the importance of collateral measures it is necessary to bear in mind the role assigned to them by the majority of countries and also the need dictated by the existing situation in the world. We all know, for instance, what enormous importance is attached by the peoples to the elimination of the nuclear menace and to the ensuing demand for the prohibition of nuclear weapons and the limitation of the nuclear arms race.

It is impossible not to agree with what the representative of Burma said at our meeting of 28 July:

"... the search for security through the continuance of the race in nuclear armaments -- which in themselves are the very source of insecurity -- must be outweighed by the saner concept of security through disarmament." (ENDC/PV.277, p.10)

The majority of countries have taken a definite stand against the use of nuclear weapons and in favour of their prohibition, against the spread of nuclear weapons and in favour of the prohibition of all tests, in favour of the establishment of denuclearized zones and against foreign military bases. There are corresponding resolutions and recommendations by the United Nations. The majority of the countries of the world have declared that the adoption of the aforesaid collateral measures would create favourable conditions for negotiations on general and complete disarmament. None of those countries considers that the adoption of the aforesaid collateral measures would jeopardize their security or upset the balance of forces.

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In the Committee, however, the opponents of effective measures for disarmament and for the elimination of the nuclear menace continue to disregard this desire of the peoples and the recommendations of the United Nations General Assembly. The Western delegations obviously do not wish and are not prepared to renounce the arms race and part with their nuclear weapons. Their arguments about the alleged danger of upsetting the balance of forces or a threat to their security are unconvincing. On the contrary, it is precisely the increasing tension in international relations that is the greatest threat to the security of the peoples.

The point in this case is not the balance of forces and the security of States but the fundamental principles of the policy of the Western military alliances, which are based on the nuclear threat and the arms race. This accounts for the position of the Western delegations in the Committee, aimed at blocking a decision on questions that are ripe for solution and at rejecting in fact a number of interesting and correct compromise proposals put forward by the delegations of the non-aligned countries in regard to various measures.

That is the situation, for instance, in respect of the proposal for the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons (ENDC/167). Besides all that has been said in support of this proposal, it can be added that this question is of direct importance both for a treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and for the future denuclearized zones, in view of the proposals already made to include it as an important element of the guarantee of the security of non-nuclear States. Such an agreement would be a very appropriate measure and would correspond to the interests of all nations, great and small.

An important contribution to the solution of this question is the proposal of the Soviet delegation that the nuclear Powers should assume an obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons (ibid.). The assumption of such an obligation by the nuclear Powers would help to a considerable extent to create an atmosphere of confidence both among the nuclear Powers and on the part of the non-nuclear Powers in regard to their security. Moreover, for the implementation of this measure no control arrangements would be necessary, there would be no upsetting of the balance of forces, nor would such a measure give unilateral advantages to anyone.

An important and urgent measure placed before the Eighteen-Nation Committee in accordance with the recommendation of the United Nations General Assembly (A/RES/2032 (XX); ENDC/161) is the question of extending the ban on nuclear tests to underground tests. In view of the importance of this question for putting an end to

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the further sophistication of nuclear weapons, an increasing number of countries are in favour of a speedy solution. During recent statements in the Eighteen-Nation Committee many representatives of non-aligned countries have pointed out the urgent need to solve this question, and have put forward suggestions aimed at finding ways and means of overcoming the standstill in achieving an agreement on the prohibition of underground tests.

All efforts in this direction, however, have been nullified by the unjustified demand of the United States of America for on-site inspection. The United States delegation makes this demand allegedly because of the need to ensure the security of the United States and because of the inadequacy of national seismic systems, even putting forward such a hackneyed reason as the "argument" about a so-called closed society. It is impossible therefore to escape the impression that all this is necessary to the United States of America so that it can cover up its unwillingness to take a political decision of principle on the question of banning all underground tests.

The reason for the intransigence of the United States delegation in this matter is evidently that the United States of America, as has already been mentioned in the Committee, is continuing to carry out a programme aimed at improving nuclear weapons and creating new types of such weapons. This is confirmed by information regarding the number of intensity of the underground tests carried out in the United States since the signing of the Moscow Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1). As has already been mentioned, there is no sign of these tests coming to an end. Yet the need to put an end to all tests is acknowledged by everyone.

One cannot but recognize as right the view expressed by the representative of Mexico on 8 March:

"Apart from its relationship with other complementary instruments, and considered strictly on its own, the Moscow Treaty must be extended to the physical environment which its provisions do not yet cover -- that is, underground -- and must not apply merely to tests under water, in the atmosphere and in outer space. The preamble to the Treaty itself imposes this duty by committing its signatories to continue negotiations in order to turn the partial treaty into a total one; and the whole of mankind demands that this should be done". (ENDC/PV.246, p.7).

We continue to believe that for the observance of an agreement to ban underground tests it will suffice to use national means of detecting and identifying underground seismic events. The extension of the scope of the Moscow Treaty would be the most

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convenient way of solving the problem. This would become possible the day after the United States of America decided to put an end to the further sophistication of nuclear weapons through underground tests.

It is well known that the idea of creating denuclearized zones in a number of regions of the world has long been put forward. Such zones would narrow the areas of dissemination of nuclear weapons. What is the attitude of the Western delegations towards such useful proposals? It must be said quite frankly: where a denuclearized zone would include areas in which the nuclear weapons of the Western countries are located or it is planned to locate them, there must be no denuclearized zone! This applies in the first place to Central Europe, although everyone knows how important it is to ensure peace and to make war impossible precisely there.

It also applies to the Balkan peninsula. So far we have not heard from the Western delegations any support for the idea of creating a denuclearized zone in the Balkans and the Adriatic area (ENDC/PV.168, p.16). Yet tendencies towards doing away with the cold war and moving on to the rails of normal international relations have emerged very clearly in that area in recent years. One would have thought that all the friends of peace would rejoice at this fact. The creation of a denuclearized zone in the balkans and the Adriatic would result in an inestimable benefit to the cause of peace in Europe, the Near East and throughout the world.

At their last meeting the War Ministers of NATO discussed the question of strengthening military measures on the south-western flank of that aggressive bloc. In the Mediterranean there is the United States Sixth Fleet, equipped with nuclear weapons. These facts once again throw light on the position of the Western delegations on questions relating to the lessening of tension in the world. Whereas in the Balkans, regardless of the differences in the social systems and of the fact that some States belong to different military blocs or stand outside them, there are signs of increasing good-neighbourly relations, at the same time the principal leaders of NATO are trying to maintain the old mistrust. But the right thing would be for the Western nuclear Powers to declare, as the Soviet Union has done, that they are prepared to respect the nuclear neutrality of the Balkans.

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We have had on several occasions an opportunity to state our views regarding the need to put a stop to the further spread of nuclear weapons, and therefore we shall not touch on the problem itself today. We shall merely say that neither within the Eighteen-Nation Committee nor outside it are there any doubts about the true meaning of the position of the United States of America and its allies in regard to this question. They do not consider that to allow the Federal Republic of Germany to participate in the ownership and disposal of nuclear weapons is proliferation. But since this would, regardless of its form, be proliferation, the conclusion of a treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons is held up by the position of the United States of America and all those who, together with the United States, maintain the concept of limited proliferation. Yet the question of non-proliferation cannot be relegated to the background. This question has to be solved not only by the nuclear States. It equally affects the interests of all States, and in order that it may be solved the active co-operation of all of them is required.

We do not think that the proposal to prohibit the production of fissile materials (ENDC/120, 165) would have any independent importance or by itself help towards preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. By itself such an isolated measure would not have the necessary effectiveness. In our opinion, priority must still be given to a non-proliferation treaty, for the simple reason that an effective treaty to prohibit the spread of nuclear weapons would enable far more fundamental and urgent problems to be solved. Such a treaty would in many respects be also an incentive to conclude a treaty banning all nuclear weapon tests.

In conclusion it remains for me to say the following.

In taking the floor in the Eighteen-Nation Committee our delegation has nothing else in mind but the interests of the cause of peace and of the Committee itself, which will not arrive at correct recommendations unless it exposes the roots of its failures. The roots lie in the political tendency of the Western delegations to put forward proposals the implementation of which would not in the least remove either the existing mistrust or the military danger, particularly the nuclear danger, and in

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their tendency, on the other hand, to reject all proposals which would indeed lead to the easing of international tension and to the prevention of a possible military catastrophe.

It is not easy to change policies, but the interests of all mankind require the Western countries to do so where disarmament questions are concerned. Ways to this are opened up by, inter alia, collateral measures for easing international tension and for disarmament. These should open up the way and lead in the end to an agreement on general and complete disarmament.

Mr. FISHER (United States of America): Resolution 2031 of the twentieth session of the United Nations General Assembly requests this Committee "to continue its efforts towards making substantial progress in reaching agreement on the question of general and complete disarmament under effective international control" (ENDC/161). My Government is in complete agreement with that recommendation. It is for that reason that I should like to speak today on that subject. I should like to suggest one practical working step we might take and one substantive problem we must deal with if we are to make progress towards that goal.

The achievement of the objective of general and complete disarmament will require the establishment of mutual confidence and trust among nations, the installation of a dependable verification system, and the strengthening of peace-keeping forces and other international institutions to guarantee the security of all nations, large and small, against any form of domination by others.

The United States has devoted itself to working with the community of nations to bring about such conditions -- to establish a peaceful world under international law in which order and justice will be provided for all. It was towards that end that President Wilson worked so diligently for the establishment of the League of Nations. It was towards that end that Presidents Roosevelt and Truman worked so effectively with other world leaders for the establishment of the United Nations, a world organization through which international disputes can be settled by peaceful means and security guaranteed for all.

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Only a little more than a month ago we were privileged to have the Minister of State for External Affairs of India, Mr. Dinesh Singh, participate in our deliberations. He pointed out that the vast resources currently being spent on arms, if they could only be diverted towards the advancement of mankind, would present possibilities for progress that would stagger the imagination (ENDC/PV.273, p.6). Implicit in his wise remarks is a challenge we must meet. It is a challenge to the vision of the world we should like to leave to our children and to succeeding generations. It is a challenge to our courage and our determination to bring that world into being. President Johnson indicated the choices open to us. He said:

"It can be a world where nations raise armies, where famine and disease and ignorance are the common lot of men, where the poor nations look on the rich with envy, bitterness and frustration, where the air is filled with tension and hatred.

"Or, it can be a world where each nation lives in independence, seeking new ways to provide a better life for its citizens; a world where the energies of its restless people are directed toward the works of peace; a world where people are free to build a civilization to liberate the spirit of man."

We cannot build such a civilization -- a civilization which will liberate the spirit of man -- unless we make progress towards general disarmament. Our task is of such vital importance to all nations that we must find a way to make progress together.

We can work together towards a mutually-acceptable solution by considering steps that do not upset the existing military balance between nations. That is the basis of the United States programme for general and complete disarmament (ENDC/30 and Corr.1 and Add.1, 2, 3). This programme is designed to stop the arms race at an agreed time, to freeze levels of armed forces and armaments, and then progressively to reduce national military establishments to levels required for the maintenance of internal order and for supporting a United Nations peace force. Provisions are made in the United States proposal for adequate verification to ensure that the terms of an agreement are being carried out, as well as for the strengthening of peace-keeping forces to maintain peace and security for all.

The Soviet proposal (ENDC/2/Rev.1 and Add.1), on the other hand, emphasizes almost total reductions of selected categories of armaments at the very outset of the disarmament process. It seeks drastic reductions of nuclear-weapon carriers at the

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very beginning of the disarmament process and prior to the establishment of adequate verification. That proposal, together with the Soviet Union's demand that all foreign bases should be liquidated and all foreign troops withdrawn from what it describes as "alien soil" in the first stage of the disarmament process (ENDC/123), not only fails to inspire the confidence and trust upon which subsequent phases can and must be build but would materially alter the existing military balance in favour of the Soviet Union, contrary to the provisions of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles (ENDC/5) under which we are working.

I might point out that at no time has the Soviet Government ever indicated how -- by what progressive steps -- such reductions would take place. This presents us with a difficulty which is not new to us. There appears to be a gap in the Soviet proposals dealing with general and complete disarmament. They do not really deal with the steps which can actually be taken now to halt the arms race and begin the process of disarmament. They appear to require agreement on how to proceed almost to the end of the road before any action is taken.

I sincerely hope that that does not mean it is the view of the Soviet Government that nothing can be done towards actually halting the arms race and beginning the process of disarmament until we are agreed on how to proceed to the end of the road, or at least almost to the end of the road, as far as the most significant armaments are concerned. If that were its view, we should be faced with the prospect of endless discussion rather than concrete action.

The differences between the approach of the United States and that of the Soviet Union to general disarmament are, I am afraid, a familiar subject to the members of this Committee. However, there is a workable means, with which we are also familiar, which might help us resolve those differences.

A central problem lies in the size and composition of deterrent forces during the process of disarmament. That question has presented a major stumbling-block to progress towards our goal. The establishment of a working group to deal with the basis on which strategic weapons might be reduced would put us on our way down the road to general and complete disarmament. However, it must be a working group

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established without pre-conditions pointing towards the acceptance of either the United States or the Soviet Union approach -- a working group that could consider both. It would inevitably have to consider the levels of deterrents to be retained during the disarmament process.

In considering the problems of deterrence during the disarmament process, such a working group could also consider the role of verification in deterrence -- a role we believe to be important because deterrence depends to a large extent on each party's knowing how it stands with respect to the other.

It is our earnest hope that our Soviet colleagues will reconsider their refusal to participate in a working group which could consider all the proposals that have been put forth. It is our earnest hope that they will not continue to insist on prior acceptance of their proposal by all participants before they are willing to join us in a working group designed to consider the problems and arrive at solutions.

I could not deal with the question of general disarmament today without also dealing with the measure which the United States has proposed to halt the build-up of strategic nuclear delivery systems while we are trying to work out ways of reducing them. On 16 April 1964 the United States formally proposed to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament the exploration of a measure designed to freeze the numbers and characteristics of offensive and defensive strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (ENDC/PV.184, pp.13 et seq.). A good deal of discussion on that proposal has taken place since that date, both in this Committee and at the United Nations. As I stated in this Committee on 15 March, one particular benefit would be that --

"... prompt adoption of the freeze proposal in 1964 would have had approximately the same result, as far as United States current inventories of nuclear delivery vehicles in this category are concerned, as a reduction of something like 50 per cent would have today." (ENDC/PV.248, p.9).

There is little use in reflecting on what might have been done in 1964; we must consider what we can do today. Today, by adopting the freeze, we can prevent a self-defeating continuation of the arms race.

Although detailed negotiations have not yet developed, the discussions on the freeze which we have had so far have proved extremely useful in clarifying the views of various nations concerning the problem of controlling strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. However, despite all the discussion, the reasons for and the importance of including anti-ballistic missiles in the freeze proposal have only recently begun to receive the discussion which they deserve.

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Developments in the area of strategic weapons have made it even clearer that the freeze of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, including anti-missile systems, is an urgent and important arms control measure. Today I should like to outline some of the more important reasons why the United States believes that that is so and, in particular, why limitations on anti-ballistic missiles are an essential part of an over-all measure involving a freeze of strategic nuclear delivery systems.

We realize of course that, under an agreement which precluded quantitative and qualitative improvements in strategic offensive forces only, the deployment of anti-missile systems might limit damage in the event of a nuclear war. However, an agreement to freeze offensive systems only, while allowing defences to be built up, could for the following reasons have undesirable consequences which might even increase the possibility that general nuclear war would occur.

We must face the fact that the strategic stability which exists today depends on the knowledge that each side has the ability to inflict unacceptable damage and casualties on the other in retaliation for an initial attack. The initiation of general nuclear war by any country would therefore result only in bringing devastation on itself. The basis of that stability will continue to depend on the ability of offensive forces to inflict unacceptable retaliatory damage until such time as we can achieve an effectively-controlled halt of the strategic arms race and the control of nuclear forces.

With a freeze of offensive forces alone, the possibility would always exist that the side facing a growing defensive missile system, while being constrained by the agreement against improving its offensive forces, would become concerned with its ability to inflict unacceptable retaliatory damage in the event that it suffered an attack. Such a situation would create undesirable tensions and uncertainties and would threaten to destroy the existing stability.

In fact, if such an agreement on offensive forces alone were signed, any nation confronted with the possibility that another nation was dangerously shifting the military balance by deploying anti-missile systems would have no choice but to react in one or both of two ways. It could abrogate the freeze agreement by exercising its

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withdrawal privilege and building its offensive forces, seeking to negate most of the effects of defensive systems at a cost significantly less than would be involved in the original defensive system. . . Alternatively, it could deploy an anti-missile system in an attempt to restore the strategic equilibrium. Neither of those choices would be desirable.

If we do not reach an agreement soon on a freeze, the strategic arms race will probably continue. If one Power deploys an anti-missile system in addition to existing offensive systems, other nations might fear that their relative strategic capability was being eroded and therefore undertake one or more counteractions, such as the parallel deployment of an anti-ballistic missile system, increased offensive deployment, or the introduction of new or improved types of weapons capable of penetrating or bypassing ballistic missile defences. The resulting arms race would be self-defeating. Higher and higher destructive potentials would be reached, and, despite the presence of defensive systems costing billions of roubles or dollars, greater casualties could result if nuclear war should occur.

It is clear that a freeze of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles which did not preclude the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems would increase the difficulties confronting our collective efforts to control the strategic arms race. Therefore I submit that by far the most effective and secure way of controlling the strategic arms race and limiting damage if war should occur is through the attainment of a measure which prevents the future growth of strategic offensive systems in concert with a freeze of strategic defensive missiles. That is what our proposal for a freeze of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles would achieve.

I hope that my intervention today has helped to clarify and explain my country's views on the importance of including both strategic offensive and defensive systems in the freeze proposal, as well as the importance of rapid consideration of the freeze of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles itself. As I have indicated, we believe that the consequences of a new round in the arms race, pitting offensive against defensive strategic weapons, are likely to be sufficiently grave that we must now redouble our efforts to agree on a measure that will preclude such a race. It is for those reasons that I feel it is most urgent that we make further progress in exploring a freeze of both offensive and defensive strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, as suggested by the United States. As always, my country is prepared to consider new ideas regarding controlling the strategic arms race, as well as proposals which have already been made, in an effort to reach agreement as soon as possible.

Mr. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): We have listened with interest to the statements made by the representative of Bulgaria, Mr. Lukanov, and the representative of the United States, Mr. Fisher. We associate ourselves with the views put forward by Mr. Lukanov, which included a detailed and precise analysis both of the general situation in which the consideration of disarmament problems is taking place, and of the situation in regard to the consideration of the disarmament problems which are in fact on the agenda of our Committee. Taking advantage of the flexibility of the procedure which has been established in the work of our Committee, with your permission, Mr. Chairman, I should like to dwell on one of the extremely important questions which we are considering here and which is connected with one of the important collateral measures in the field of disarmament.

The current session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee is drawing to a close. At today's meeting we should like to sum up some of the results of the discussion of one of the most important questions that have been considered during the last two sessions of the Eighteen-Nation Committee: the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is not at all surprising that the Committee has devoted a considerable part of its time precisely to this question. Linked with the solution of this question is the hope of putting an end to, or in any case reducing, the danger arising from the fact of the dissemination of nuclear weapons - their physical, geographical and political dissemination.

The hope of solving the question of non-proliferation, if not bright, was at least well defined, because such a solution appeared to everyone to be not so very complicated and difficult. It would seem that, if the slightest willingness and a minimum of goodwill were displayed, the States could be freed from the growing and ever less controllable danger that nuclear weapons would appear in the armaments of a great many States, thus acquiring a universal character with all the consequences arising therefrom.

In concluding the consideration of this question at the present session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, we cannot say that we have succeeded in finding a solution to this problem, or even that we have been able to define common approaches which would bring the positions of the two sides closer together. It would not be inexact to say that no progress has been made in the Committee in solving the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and that, although this question has been examined in the Committee for more than six months, the situation in this regard is still the same

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

as it was in January of this year, when the Committee, at the request and on the recommendation of the twentieth session of the General Assembly (A/RES/2028(XX); ENDC/161), started to consider the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

What is the reason for this so obviously disappointing situation in regard to the consideration and solution of this problem? The reason is to be found in the fact that the United States and its Western partners have not shown the slightest willingness to reach agreement on the question of non-proliferation. To speak quite frankly, the Western Powers have had no desire and have made no efforts to achieve a solution to this problem. This is shown by the indisputable fact that, in rejecting the Soviet draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (ENDC/164) as a basis for the solution of this problem, the United States virtually failed to submit its own draft treaty on this question. The draft treaty which it submitted (ENDC/152 and Add.1) merely concerned the regulation of the use of United States nuclear weapons by the military allies of the United States, and did not deal with the problem of the non-proliferation of these weapons at all.

In the circumstances when one side seeks to achieve a solution of the problem of non-proliferation while the other side talks about a different problem, namely regulation of the use of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear Powers, is it possible to find a uniform approach to the solution of the problem of non-proliferation? Of course not. One side seeks to achieve its solution, while the other side does not even dream of it. The difference between the approaches of the Soviet Union and the United States to the question of non-proliferation is as glaring as, for instance, the difference between a demand for prohibition of the traffic in narcotics and a proposal for ways and means of organizing this traffic.

During the entire period in which the problem of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons has been under consideration in the Committee, the United States side has been trying to persuade us to examine the question of a "veto" on the use of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear Powers, the question of electronic locks, their purpose, their reliability and so forth. But all these questions relate to the problem of regulating the use of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear countries, and not at all to the problem of the non-proliferation of such weapons. In the circumstances when one side - the United States of America - does not seek a solution to the problem of non-proliferation but is in fact trying to divert the Committee from the solution of this problem, it is not at all surprising that we have not found a common approach or a common understanding of the task which has been placed before the Committee.

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

We have already stressed repeatedly that, if a treaty were concluded on the basis of the United States draft or according to the United States pattern, the possibilities for the dissemination of nuclear weapons would not diminish but increase. If a non-nuclear State should wish to have nuclear weapons today, it would come up against many difficulties. It would either have to organize its own production of such weapons, which would require enormous efforts and expense, or it would have to obtain such weapons from a nuclear Power, and that would undoubtedly give rise to an unfavourable political reaction throughout the world.

In a world in which the United States treaty on non-proliferation were in force, the acquisition of nuclear weapons from nuclear Powers would be quite legal. The only problem facing a non-nuclear State which desired to possess nuclear weapons would be that of choosing an opportune moment to free itself from any inconvenient commitment in respect of the use of the nuclear weapons which it would already have in its hands.

In regard to the possibility of the manufacture of nuclear weapons by other States, it is usually estimated that there are about ten such States at present. For example, the United States magazine U.S. News and World Report reported in its issue of 18 July:

"At least ten States (apart from the present nuclear Powers) already have or will soon have the possibility of manufacturing nuclear bombs...

From now until 1970 these ten Powers, if they so wish, could produce 1,000 bombs a year. They possess, in fact, the necessary raw materials ..."

If there is now talk about the possibility of the emergence of ten new nuclear countries, under the United States treaty many dozens of States would very soon acquire the possibility of transforming themselves into nuclear Powers. For such transformation the only thing required would be to take the appropriate political decisions.

It goes without saying that this prospect cannot be accepted by those who really desire to solve the problem of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Obviously the United States draft treaty cannot in any case be taken as the basis for the solution of this problem. During the whole period of the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, when the United States delegation was asking us to solve the problem of non-proliferation on the basis of the United States draft treaty, it was clear to the majority of the members of the Committee that the situation in that regard was becoming hopeless. We have repeatedly stressed that the United States draft does not contain any basis whatsoever either for a solution of the problem of non-proliferation or for negotiations on that subject. Throughout the present session of the Committee the United States has compelled us to waste time on debates without the slightest prospect of success.

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

At the beginning of July of this year it might have appeared, nevertheless, that the United States had become aware of the situation into which it had led the consideration of the problem of non-proliferation, and that perhaps it would make a move in this regard that would enable us to get out of the impasse in which the consideration of this question is stalled. An indication of this was President Johnson's statement, at a press conference in Johnson City on 5 July, in which he said that the United States was going to do everything within the power of the most imaginative people to find a language that would bring the nuclear Powers together in a treaty that would provide non-proliferation (ENDC/PV.276, p.12).

It might have been expected that that statement of the President of the United States would have stimulated the United States delegation to give the Committee at long last an opportunity to deal with the question of non-proliferation as such, and not the regulation of the use of nuclear weapons by means of a veto and electronic locks. The hope was born that the United States delegation would at last agree to consider in a businesslike manner the Soviet draft treaty on non-proliferation, and would propose any amendments or additions which it deemed necessary, or, again, that it would submit a draft treaty of its own which would deal with the problem of non-proliferation as such but not the regulation of the use of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear countries.

But a month has passed since that statement was made by the President of the United States; another month has begun and the work of this session of the Committee is coming to an end. There has been no initiative on the part of the United States. There has been no movement in the direction of a search for agreement on non-proliferation. There is no intention on the part of the United States to discuss the question of non-proliferation as such, and not the problem of regulating the use of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear States.

This situation can hardly be due to non-existence in the United States of the "most imaginative people" who could seek and find a language for a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In fact, to seek and find the necessary language for such a treaty it is hardly necessary to have a particularly developed imagination. For this purpose what is needed is not so much imagination as the desire and readiness of the United States to conclude the aforesaid treaty. But we have not discovered in the United States delegation here in the Committee either the desire or the readiness to conduct businesslike negotiations for the conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation.

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

In the light of what has happened in the past and what is happening now in the Committee, no impartial observer could say that the delegation of the United States has shown, either before or after the President's statement of 5 July, any genuine readiness to consider and solve the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the way that has been recommended to us by resolution 2028(XX) of the General Assembly of the United Nations. The gist of the matter is that the United States is neither willing nor prepared to accept such a solution of the problem of non-proliferation as would prevent access to nuclear weapons by West Germany through any NATO nuclear force.

In choosing between two alternatives-- either a non-proliferation treaty or the granting of access to nuclear weapons to the Federal Republic of Germany through the creation of a NATO joint nuclear force--the United States, as events have shown, is obviously in favour of the latter. The gist of the matter is that in the United States and in the North Atlantic bloc the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons has so far been regarded as a subordinate one depending on the problem of the nuclear armament of the allies of the United States in NATO, and first and foremost of West Germany. This was quite clearly stated after negotiations in the United States by the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. Erhardt, who said last December that "there was agreement that a solution to the allied nuclear problem merited priority over a treaty barring proliferation" (The New York Times, 22 December 1965, p.10).

In choosing between the two alternatives -- the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty or the grant to West Germany of a "nuclear voice" in a NATO joint force -- the United States has in fact chosen the latter. The correctness of this assessment of the situation in regard to the proliferation of nuclear weapons is shown by the fact that, while the negotiations on non-proliferation are marking time here in the Committee, nuclear co-operation within the framework of NATO is expanding successfully.

It suffices to point out, for instance, the results of the meeting of the Defence Ministers of NATO in July of this year, to which the representative of Bulgaria, Mr. Lukanov, has referred today. At that meeting of Defence Ministers of NATO decisions were taken concerning further steps to extend the access of non-nuclear members of the North Atlantic bloc to nuclear weapons. Permit me in this connexion to quote some press reports on the results of this meeting:

The New York Times of 27 July writes:

"The North Atlantic Treaty Organization's proposed special committee on sharing nuclear weapons came one step closer to permanent form today."

The Daily Telegraph of 27 July writes:

"The Ministers felt that while Bonn was still without a finger on the nuclear trigger, the Federal Republic could, through the committee, now be given a share in the employment of atomic weapons."

The Guardian of 27 July writes:

"The committee declared in its later communiqué that it considered primarily the methods of expanding the participation of the allies in the planning of nuclear strategy."

In our turn we too can say that there is nothing in the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee to show that the United States has chosen the first alternative, namely the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty. Thus the military nuclear co-operation of the United States with the Federal Republic of Germany and some other partners in NATO is developing at full speed, whereas the negotiations on non-proliferation in the Eighteen-Nation Committee are blocked by the position of the United States, by the United States draft treaty.

When at a press conference on 13 July the Secretary of State of the United States, Mr. Rusk, was asked whether the United States Government was now prepared to give preference to a non-proliferation treaty rather than to share nuclear weapons with the countries of Western Europe, Mr. Rusk did not say "Yes". He tried to make out that two different questions were concerned. In fact, the United States has a dual approach. In words the United States declares that it is in favour of an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; but in fact it is working to retain for itself the right to transfer such weapons to whomsoever it wishes.

It is with every justification that the United States press, and in particular the competent and well-informed journalist John Finney, in analysing the position of the United States on the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, has stressed that responsible leaders in the United States, especially at the highest levels, are inclined to refer to a non-proliferation treaty as a "scrap of paper" and assign diplomatic priority to the aim of granting West Germany the right to participate in a joint nuclear force. United States officials are afraid of "offending" West Germany by concluding a non-proliferation treaty, and therefore they do not wish to include in the treaty the corresponding obituary of NATO multilateral nuclear forces, without which the treaty would be meaningless.

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

When future historians acquaint themselves with our negotiations on the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, they will be horrified at the levity shown by the United States in this regard. In the solution of so important a problem, on which depend the security, peace and fate of the nations, the United States, motivated by its transient political interests, is creating endless and unnecessary delays and obstacles.

It is impossible to rule out the possibility that after a while nuclear weapons will be possessed by many States which are not at present nuclear countries. That could well be the result of our unsuccessful work on a treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons -- unsuccessful because the United States has not been prepared to accept, has not made efforts to achieve, and has not wanted to have such a treaty; because the United States is obsessed by the prospect of being at the head of a military alliance of States equipped with United States nuclear weapons and United States electronic locks, and, through such a distribution and use of nuclear weapons, of being at the apex of the nuclear pyramid and of dictating from that height its will to other nations.

There is nothing more absurd or senseless than to build prospects of such a kind. But unfortunately there is nothing to show that such a prospect has been rejected by the United States. So far, all the facts, the whole course of events and all our experience in the negotiations on non-proliferation show that this is precisely what the United States is striving for, and that up to now all efforts to give another direction to the course of events have been unsuccessful.

The United States is taking upon itself a great responsibility. The history of disarmament negotiations has already shown examples of how, on account of its rigid and inflexible position, the United States has frustrated the solution of questions which have consequently remained unsolved to this day. The problem of preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons can still be solved. The Soviet delegation is prepared to exert all its efforts to this end. We appeal to the United States side to abandon its present position and to meet the wishes of the peoples, and to reach agreement on the prevention of the further spread -- direct and indirect -- of nuclear weapons.

Mr. LAHODA (Czechoslovakia): The interventions of a number of speakers at preceding meetings have followed basically two lines of thought. Some delegations have continued to deal with concrete measures which have been the subject of our deliberations throughout the session and have continued to clarify their positions on individual questions. At the same time, however, their statements have more and more frequently contained general considerations on the past work of the Committee and recommendations concerning the future direction of our activities here.

There is no doubt that such observations and comments have been inspired to a considerable extent by the fact that this year again, as in the past, the Committee has not accomplished anything, has not moved ahead but has continued to mark time. The sterility of our discussions necessarily makes us give thought to the methods of and approach to disarmament negotiations applied heretofore; it indicates again the need to clarify which course should be taken and on which problems, both in general and complete disarmament and in the field of collateral measures, our attention should be focussed so that we may not lose time and so that we may carry out the task entrusted to us.

That is also the spirit in which the Czechoslovak delegation has tried to contribute to the Committee's work. My delegation naturally asks what should be done so that we may overcome the prolonged stagnation in our activities. We say quite openly that we are not satisfied with the present state of our negotiations. We think it is highly urgent that this situation, to which we cannot and must not reconcile ourselves, should take a turn for the better in the foreseeable future. That is necessary not only from the point of view of the position and authority of this Committee but also, primarily, from the point of view of the importance which solutions to individual problems on our agenda would have as regards world developments in general.

At our last meeting the representative of the United Kingdom, Lord Chalfont, evoked the words of the late President Kennedy when he said that peace was a process, a way of solving problems, that peace did not mean simply the absence of war (ENDC/PV.281, pp.). We fully subscribe to that, and we understand that such a process requires practical steps and initiatives that will give it direction, the right speed and orientation towards the safeguarding and strengthening of lasting security. That is very important, since not to have war does not mean not to prepare for one; it does not mean that the process will not end in the very opposite, in a conflict of unprecedented dimensions. The intensified military preparations and the series of

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aggressive acts on the part of the United States which, under the cloak of a "peace-making process", is even fighting a cruel, undeclared war against the people of Viet-Nam, only prove that. If, according to the definition I have quoted, peace is a series of positive steps building up to a world without war, then such steps must be prepared thoughtfully and put into effect with consistency and without delay. Otherwise we may face the danger of having a differently qualified peace: peace as a mere intermission between two wars.

We believe that the Eighteen-Nation Committee has an important place in the constructive process of building a stable peace. It should create favourable conditions for peaceful solutions to problems and contribute to a relaxation of international tensions and to the elimination of wars as a means for the settlement by force of international disputes.

However, an objective evaluation of our Committee's work shows that it does not fulfil that requirement. Even if we admit that in the past the Committee has made a certain contribution towards creating a basis for agreement on the partial nuclear test ban, nothing can change the fact that in general the Committee's deliberations have not been fruitful. In recent years this unfavourable state of affairs has been accompanied by a substantial aggravation of the international situation adversely affected by the systematically intensified, aggressive course of United States policy, most markedly manifested in the use of military force against nations in South-East Asia. No wonder that that escalation is accompanied by a new intensity in the arms race.

That unfavourable development has, after all, limited the scope of the Committee's possibilities. On numerous occasions it has been said here that the Committee is not an isolated phenomenon existing in a vacuum. Its possibilities are to a great extent affected by the attitudes of the governments of States members of the Committee. It follows that the fundamental prerequisites to its success or failure are created outside its framework. Accordingly, positive results in our work are conditioned by a revision of the political course of the States whose policies are contradicting the Committee's efforts. In present conditions that applies in particular to the policy of the United States.

That does not mean that we underestimate or regard as negligible the importance of the Committee's possibilities within its terms of reference, the direction of its work, or its search for procedures that will best meet the existing situation. On the contrary, we believe it necessary that the Committee should pay regard to the

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specific conditions and that it should strive for the adoption of such measures as would be not only significant and urgent in the present situation but realistic as well.

It is from that position that the Czechoslovak delegation approaches the Committee's objectives and the assessment of the chances it has to implement them. We cannot close our eyes to the fact that the United States is following the course of expanding the aggressive war in South-East Asia. Last week's reports of the decision to transfer ground attacks to the territory of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam also give new evidence of that. The United States orientation as regards the intensification of the arms race, the further perfecting of nuclear weapons, and efforts to consolidate NATO at the cost of making far-reaching concessions to the Federal Republic of Germany on the question of its participation in nuclear integration has brought about a situation in which the Committee's deliberations inevitably face obstacles in the way of its reaching agreement on the principal questions of disarmament.

Those circumstances weaken especially the prospects for the realization of general and complete disarmament, which we, along with a number of other delegations, regard as the primary objective in the field of disarmament and fully in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2031 (XX) (ENDC/161). The present unfavourable situation could change for the better, especially if the United States stopped its aggression in Viet-Nam and if measures were taken to consolidate European security. There is no doubt that such steps would contribute considerably to better prospects for our making progress in discussions on the fundamental disarmament questions.

Earlier in my statement today I expressed my conviction that the Eighteen-Nation Committee should take an active part in the process of consolidating peace, and I also pointed to elements which tie its hands and paralyse its work in that direction. However, despite those limitations the Committee should seek acceptable solutions to individual, specific questions with which it has been dealing for such a long time. It is in that field that the Committee has a number of possibilities of which it should fully avail itself. They are linked to solutions of grave problems urged by a majority of countries. They must be given preference over other less effective and less urgent proposals.

That prerequisite has been met only in part with regard to the selection and the consideration of such measures. In our day the core of disarmament lies in averting the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war. That is the right angle from which to approach discussion on general and complete disarmament and on collateral measures.

(Mr. Lahoda, Czechoslovakia)

It is understandable that the nuclear threat cannot be finally eliminated by partial measures only. These, however, might contribute considerably to making it less imminent and might facilitate reaching a mutually-acceptable agreement. The adoption of individual partial measures, although highly significant, would not remove the necessity for efforts to avert the danger of a nuclear war. It would represent only the first steps paving the way to and facilitating other more radical measures for the implementation of nuclear disarmament, for the elimination of the existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons, and for the prohibition of their manufacture.

Therefore the temporary attention given to some partial problems should not be interpreted as a retreat from the main objective of the Committee, which is still general and complete disarmament. In that connexion it is necessary to underline that it is impossible to accept the view that individual partial steps should replace general and complete disarmament.

We have been presented with quite a number of proposals the implementation of which would make it possible to advance the operation against the danger of a nuclear war along a broad front. However, such a possibility has so far not been utilized. The measures to prevent further dissemination of nuclear weapons and the extension of the nuclear test ban to underground explosions have rightly received priority. Of the other proposed measures, the Czechoslovak delegation attaches the greatest importance to the proposal for the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, or the undertaking by nuclear Powers of the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, and to the proposals for the creation of nuclear-free zones in different parts of the world (ENDC/167). We regret to say that the delegations of the Western Powers have taken a negative stand on those proposals. They have likewise avoided consideration of them in the Committee. Instead they have urged consideration of questions intended to distract the Committee's attention.

Unfortunately, even the discussions on questions which have been placed to the fore this year -- that is, the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons and the extension of the nuclear test ban to underground tests -- have met with serious obstacles. The member States of NATO have placed their egoistic interests above the common interests of all members of the international community. On the question of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, they have been trying to subordinate the non-dissemination treaty to partial interests in the sphere of the nuclear armament of some NATO countries, primarily to meet the demands for nuclear emancipation of the militaristic and revenge-seeking elements in the Federal Republic of Germany.

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As a result non-dissemination, according to the concept of those countries, and particularly of the United States, has degenerated -- as the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Roshchin, stated again in his intervention this morning -- to measures that would limit the right of non-nuclear-weapon States to use nuclear weapons which, according to that concept, they might acquire from the existing nuclear Powers. It is evident that that cannot be the starting-point for any solution to the problem of preventing dissemination.

A similar situation has prevailed for years in the discussions on the extension of the nuclear test ban to underground tests. As is well known, the United States alleges that the prohibition of underground tests without on-site inspections would jeopardize its security. That contention has been refuted many times, and not only by the socialist countries. In many other countries, including the United States, the voices of competent authorities are increasingly heard pointing out the groundlessness of the approach of the United States Government. In that connexion I should like to quote at least a statement by the former scientific adviser to President Kennedy, Dr. Wiesner. According to reports in the United States Press, Dr. Wiesner stated inter alia in his testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate in June this year:

"Seismic detection has now advanced to the point that there would be adequate safeguards, even without on-site inspections, against any clandestine tests that could imperil the national security." (The New York Times, 29 June 1966, p.7)

The delegations of the socialist countries have many times pointed to the fact that the obstacle to the reaching of agreement on an underground test ban is neither the question of control nor concern about United States security. The solution of this problem depends only on the adoption of an appropriate political decision.

It is evident from what I have stated in brief that the implementation of often less-demanding partial measures, as well as the far-reaching programme of general and complete disarmament, basically depends on the attitude of individual countries towards these questions. It depends on them whether our efforts will be crowned with success. If this Committee is to meet its responsibilities and if it is to be an active factor in the process of safeguarding peace, it is for the Western Powers -- and the United States in particular -- to harmonize their policies and actions with the principles which they approved by their votes in the United Nations. Thus they

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would facilitate the implementation of the General Assembly resolutions concerning general and complete disarmament, non-dissemination, and the other collateral measures on which the attention of the Committee has rightly been focussed.

Mr. FISHER (United States of America): I shall, of course, study the remarks of my Soviet colleague. As I understood them, they in fact amounted to a charge that the United States was wasting the time of this Committee because it had not proposed amendments to its draft treaty to meet Soviet objections. I have listened -- but, I am afraid, without success -- for any indication that the Soviet Union is prepared to amend its position in an attempt to meet some of the points we have made. I shall, of course, study those remarks in considerably more detail and deal with them later at the proper time.

However, I could not help observing that, in drawing some conclusions about the motivation of the United States, which were, to describe them mildly, not very flattering, the Soviet representative drew at some length on the U.S. News and World Report, John Finney and other sources. He also included an earlier press report of the Secretary of State. Without intending any disrespect for those fine sources of information, I think it is appropriate to draw his attention and the attention of the Committee to the observations made by the Secretary of State on 5 August when he was asked about the President's statement that we were seeking a compromise.

The Secretary of State pointed out that we were seeking a compromise and trying to find out whether the problem was one of formula or language, or whether there was a major difference in substance standing in our way. He indicated that his own point of view was that he was neither pessimistic nor optimistic, and it is a point of view that I believe I can share. He did not point out -- because it has been said so many times that it was not necessary for him to repeat it -- that before a compromise can be worked out there must be motion from both sides.

The CHAIRMAN (Nigeria): I have a proposal by the co-Chairmen for the consideration of the Committee.

The co-Chairmen have agreed to recommend to the Conference that the Conference adjourn following its plenary meeting on 25 August 1966. The co-Chairmen have consulted other delegations and believe that this date appears to be the desired recess time for the majority of the delegations.

(The Chairman, Nigeria)

I understand that there is a consensus in the Committee to accept that recommendation. If there is no comment, I shall take it that the proposal is accepted.

It was so decided.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): If I understand aright, we are not yet communicating to the Press the date of our adjournment. I fully agree, because I think we shall have to inform the Press of the date of our adjournment at the same time as we communicate our report, in which I think there will be an indication that our Committee will be able to meet again after the end of the debate in the United Nations General Assembly.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 282nd plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. G.O. Ijewere, representative of Nigeria.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Bulgaria, the United States, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Italy.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 18 August 1966, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.15 p.m.

